Beyond Chou`s motivations, it is essential to take into account the impact of the talks on the Geneva negotiations. On 9 July, Chauvel dined with Li K`enung and Chang Wen-t`ien, Deputy Foreign Minister and CPR Ambassador to the Soviet Union. Chauvel opened the conversation – as he later told Johnson – by complaining that the discussions with Viet Minh did not go well, that Viet Minh was exorbitant and well beyond the position declared by Chou En-lais. Chinese delegates were surprised, but said nothing in direct response. Chang said, however, that Chou had had a “very good meeting” with Ho Chi Minh, the results of which “would be useful for French.” Chauvel had the impression – which seems to be true after the fact – that Viet Minh had been given carte blanche by the Soviets and the Chinese, to the point where their demands were unacceptable to the French, at a time when the Soviets and/or the Chinese were forced to intervene. [doc. 66] If this were the case, Chou`s interview with Ho, who came to Mends-France and his negotiators, could show no sign of intransigence than his predecessors Laniel and Bidault, who had to inform Viet Minh that the “point” had been reached and that they had to soften their demands if an agreement were ever to be reached. For Britain, the agreements meant the end of a war that, more than once, threatened to involve the United States and risk a regional flare-up. If the point of direct American intervention had been reached, the Churchill administration would have faced an extremely difficult decision: to participate with an old ally in a war project that Britain considered politically wrong and stupid militarily, or to break with Washington, thus challenging the Anglo-American alliance. Britain`s coherent advice to delay irreversible military measures, including the creation of a South-East Asian defence organization, until the Communists were given the opportunity to redeem themselves from their announced dedication to a peaceful solution to Indochina, was reluctantly accepted by the United States; the decision to follow or ignore American leaders was averted.

In accordance with the agreements with France, Smith received new instructions on 16 July on the basis of the Seven Points. After repeating the passive formal role of the United States at the conference, Dulles informed his undersecretary that he would make a unilateral (or, if possible, multilateral) declaration if a “essentially” seven-point settlement were to be reached. “However, the United States will not be co-signed in a statement with the Communists,” Dulles wrote of the procedure discussed in Geneva to develop military agreements and a final statement on a political solution. Similarly, according to Smith`s instructions, the United States should not be placed in a position where it could be held responsible for guaranteeing the outcome of the conference. Dulles said Smith`s efforts should focus on conveying ideas to “active negotiators” such as France, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. As the French and British pondered the impact of the seven points, behind-the-scenes negotiations continued in the context of a new Viet Minh military advance. At about the same time, the Viet Minh made their first concrete proposal for division, with their troops on the ground completing their deployment from the Nbienphu region. In mid-June, according to the U.S. Secret Service, Viet Minh was believed to be ready for a massive attack in the delta. Another report spoke of their increased attention to southern Annam and an obvious build-up of military force. In the face of these developments, it is not surprising that Viet Minh responded at the end of June to the French proposal for a division at the 18th parallel with a plan for a line in the south of Annam, northwest of the 13th to the 14th parallel, that is to say from Tuy Hoa on the coast via Pleiku to the Cambodian border.